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Should Scientific Realists be platonists?     
JACOB BUSCH & JOE MORRISON  
Abstract 
Enhanced Indispensability Arguments (EIA) claim that Scientific Realists are committed to 
the existence of mathematical entities due to their reliance on Inference to the Best Explana-
tion (IBE). Our central question concerns this purported parity of reasoning: do people who 
defend the EIA make an appropriate use of the resources of Scientific Realism (in particular, 
IBE) to achieve platonism? (§2) We argue that just because a variety of different inferential 
strategies can be employed by Scientific Realists does not mean that ontological conclusions 
concerning which things we should be Scientific Realists about are arrived at by any inferen-
tial route which eschews causes (§3), and nor is there any direct pressure for Scientific Real-
ists to change their inferential methods (§4). We suggest that in order to maintain inferential 
parity with Scientific Realism, proponents of EIA need to give details about how and in what 
way the presence of mathematical entities directly contribute to explanations (§5). 
Introduction 
The Explanatory or Enhanced Indispensability Argument (EIA) claims that since mathemati-
cal objects feature in the best explanations of empirical phenomena, we should believe in 
their existence.  EIA is supposed to give empirical reasons, of the sort normally used in argu1 -
ing for the existence of physical entities, to think that abstracta exist, and as such it is target-
ed at Scientific Realists. We can state this argument more perspicuously as follows:  2
1. Scientific Realists maintain that scientific observations are rationally sufficient for be-
lieving in the existence of unobservable entities. 
2. Scientific Realists employ Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) to show how their 
Realist commitments to the existence of unobservable entities are rationally defensible 
on the basis of the scientific observations. 
3. There is at least one Genuine Mathematical Explanation of scientific observations. 
(‘GME’). 
4. Mathematical Realists, like Scientific Realists, can employ IBE; to do so is to use the 
same epistemic or inferential resources as Scientific Realists. (‘Parity’).  
5. Mathematical Realists employ IBE to show how their Realist commitments to the exis-
tence of abstract entities are rationally defensible on the basis of Genuine Mathemati-
cal Explanations of scientific observations. (EIA) 
6. Scientific Realists should be Mathematical Realists. 
 We will proceed on the assumption that EIA is employed to argue in favour of platonism: the claim that mathematical 1
objects exist and that mathematical objects are abstracta, as this makes EIA more interesting than if it is used to argue 
for mathematical realism construed non-platonistically. If EIA is supposed to be used to argue for a non-abstract ontol-
ogy for mathematics, it is unclear exactly why we would need it, since presumably there are alternative epistemic routes 
for establishing this conclusion.
 We have in mind the EIA that appear in the work of, among others, Alan Baker (Baker 2001, 2005, 2009), Mark Coly2 -
van (2001, 2002, 2006), Aidan Lyon and Colyvan (2008), and Sorin Bangu (2013).
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In effect, the conclusion, 6., says that we have the same indirect, inferential epistemic access 
to unobservables (such as electrons or black holes) as we do to abstracta (such as numbers), 
and so anyone who believes in the existence of the former should also believe in the exis-
tence of the latter: Scientific Realists’ should be platonists and not nominalists about mathe-
matical objects. While the presentation of the argument above is distinctive, any variety of 
EIA which employs IBE, and does so on the basis of its role in Scientific Realism more gener-
ally, will be subject to our concerns. Our argument is primarily directed at denying ‘parity’, 
and its main effect is to increase the burden of proof required for defending ‘GME’.  
In section 1 we will introduce the key components of this argument (IBE, ‘GME’ and 
‘parity’) in closer detail. In section 2 we investigate the relationship between IBE and EIA. In 
part, both of these sections explore whether IBE involves a causal model of explanation, and 
what consequences this has for ‘parity’ in the case of EIA. The supposition is that if Scientific 
Realists only use a causal model of explanation when they rely upon IBE, then since abstrac-
ta are causally-inefficacious, considerations of ‘parity’ will prevent EIA from delivering pla-
tonism. The challenge to this supposition comes in two parts. The first question is whether 
Scientific Realists actually restrict their inferential resources to causal models of IBE. The 
second challenge (prompted by Mark Colyvan) is whether Scientific Realists should use non-
causally based IBE. In section 3 we suggest that when it comes to arguing for the existence of 
entities, Scientific Realists employ causal versions of IBE, and this blocks the possibility of 
‘parity’ in EIA. In section 4 we address the question of whether Scientific Realists should 
change their inferential practices to permit a non-causal model of IBE for inferring to the ex-
istence of entities; we argue that the cases proposed by Colyvan are insufficient. We conclude 
that ‘parity’ between Scientific Realist’s inferential practices and those used in EIA will not 
entail platonism. 
While these are the details of our argument, from a greater distance this paper is more gen-
erally concerned with how debates in the philosophy of science about ontological commit-
ments might develop. If someone wants to argue that Scientific Realists should be Mathemat-
ical Realists because the step to Mathematical Realism is just another application of things 
that Scientific Realists already do, then they need to pay closer attention to what Scientific 
Realists already do. What we show is that, on closer inspection, Scientific Realists: are high 
selective about what they are realist about (they rarely endorse the existence of everything in 
a theory, for example); employ different inferential strategies in different places (moves they 
make to neutralise sceptical examples aren’t moves they would make to infer the existence of 
a new thing); have a strong preference for identifying causes and cause-based reasoning. Our 
narrower goal is to highlight how these features suggest that the argument (1–6 above) to 
convince Scientific Realists to be Mathematical Realist by some sort of parity-of-reasoning 
will not work. But the broader goal here is to draw attention to the idea that while other In-
dispensability Arguments focus on what practising scientists do (how do they infer the exis-
tence of new entities), the focus is actually about paying attention to what Scientific 
Realists do.  Much of the discussion of Indispensability Arguments has focussed on how sci3 -
entists reason, and whether the same inferential strategies that they use could deliver platon-
ism. Here, we view the metaphysical issue as concerning what the arguments do in the phi-
losophy of science, and not about how the evidence gets used in the field of science. 
§1 Some components of the argument 
 These two populations may overlap.3
!2
Final draft. Please cite version published in Synthese 2015 doi: 10.1007/s11229-015-0676-6
Accounts of IBE differ in a range of important respects, but we take the following to repre-
sent its general form:  4
1. E is a collection of data (facts, observations etc.). 
2. H explains E, or H would, if true, explain E. 
3. No other hypothesis explains E better than H does.  
4. Therefore there is reason to believe that H is (at least) approximately true. 
The argument we have reconstructed in the introduction above claims that if Mathematical 
Realists can defend the existence of mathematical objects using IBE, then our subsequent 
commitment to abstracta is just as legitimate as any commitment to unobservable objects 
that is arrived at on the basis of IBE. We have labelled the pivotal premises in this argument 
‘parity’ and ‘GME’.  
GME claims that there is at least one case (and potentially more than one case) in which a 
mathematically-committed hypothesis H explains a collection of data E, and for which no 
other hypothesis explains E better than H does. Several such cases of purported Genuine 
Mathematical Explanations are discussed by mathematical realists and anti-realists; these 
include Baker’s (2005) example concerning the prime life-cycles of periodic North American 
cicada, and Lyon and Colyvan’s (2008) example of the role that Hales’ proof of the Honey-
comb Conjecture plays in the best explanation of bees’ hive-building behaviour.   5
Baker’s (2009) responses to criticisms of his cicada example are instructive in clarifying 
what’s required for a Genuine Mathematical Explanation. For example, it seems clear that 
the explanandum involved in a case of GME has to describe ‘purely physical’ phenomena, 
since otherwise the EIA will be question-begging by invoking abstracta to describe mathe-
matical phenomena that a Scientific Realist might not recognise as a legitimate explanandum 
in the first place (2009, 619). 
An additional requirement that Baker discusses is whether the mathematically-committed 
hypothesis, the explanans of a Genuine Mathematical Explanation, must be ‘explanatory in 
its own right’ (2009, 622). Must the mathematics in the explanans be directly responsible for 
the hypothesis’ ability to explain the physical phenomenon? It seems prima facie insufficient, 
for the purposes of the GME, that the mathematics features as an indispensable but non-ex-
planatory  component of a wider explanation. This is agreed on both sides of the debate be-
tween nominalists and proponents of EIA.  But, Baker argues, there are no adequate grounds 6
for distinguishing whether the mathematics directly (or even indirectly) contributes to the 
explanatoriness of an explanans from the possibility that it plays an essential but non-ex-
planatory role. Baker initially suggests that there is an impasse here: “Does the platonist need 
to give a positive argument for why the mathematics in the [GME] case is explanatory in its 
 This suggestion is similar to formulations found in Lycan 1988, Josephson and Josephson 1994, Psillos 2002, 2007 4
and Mackonis 2013. We will not evaluate what the correct formulation of IBE should be. The qualification that ‘H 
would, if true, explain E’ reflects Lipton’s (2004) qualification based on the observation that we only take hypotheses 
or theories to be actual explanations in so far as they are true. Any hypothesis that acts as an explanation for some E is a 
potential explanation but only true hypotheses can be actual explanations. Sorin Bangu (2008, 2012) and Mary Leng 
(2005, 2010) suggest that construing explanation factively is question-begging in this context.
 Further GME cases are discussed in Batterman (2010).5
 See for example the exchange between Mark Colyvan (2002) and Joseph Melia (2002). Despite their differences, 6
Melia (nominalist) and Colyvan (platonist) agree that if mathematics can be shown to be contributory “in the appro-
priate way,” then EIA should be considered persuasive (Colvyan 2002, p. 70).
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own right, or does the nominalist need to give a positive argument to the contrary?” (2009, 
624). But on the grounds that a) there are no extant (nominalist) arguments for thinking that 
there cannot be cases in which the mathematical hypothesis is ‘explanatory in its own right’, 
and b) there are cases in which scientists seem happy to treat the mathematical hypotheses as 
genuinely explanatory, Baker concludes that platonists have no burden of proof here. That is, 
he thinks it is sufficient for the purposes of EIA that a GME can be given, and there is no 
further obligation to demonstrate that the mathematics are directly responsible for the ex-
planatoriness of the explanans involved. In section 4 we present some reasons for thinking 
that the burden does not fall wholly on the nominalist who wishes to block EIA, and that 
mathematical realist has an obligation to say more about how and when the mathematics is 
contributing to the explanatoriness of the explanans. We argue that these obligations follow 
from the conditions for meeting ‘parity’. 
‘Parity’ says that in using IBE to infer to the truth of mathematically-committed hypotheses 
that feature in GMEs, Mathematical Realists are using nothing but the inferential tools 
which Scientific Realists already keep in their inferential toolbox. The point of ‘parity’ is to 
show that the reason why Scientific Realists should accept the existence of numbers, sets, 
functions or other abstracta is no different from the reasons that they rely upon for believing 
in unobservable entities like black holes and electrons. If ‘parity’ is false – if the inferences 
employed in reasoning from observations of hexagonal beehives to the existence of abstracta 
are different from kinds of inferences employed in reasoning from observations of patterns 
on a monitor (or suchlike) to the existence of electrons – then there is no reason for scientific 
realists to be mathematical realists.  
The role of ‘parity’ in the argument does not require complete equivalence of inferential re-
sources between Mathematical Realism and Scientific Realism; all it needs is for the infer-
ences employed by Scientific Realism (in this case, IBE) to be sufficient for arguing for Math-
ematical Realism. As such, ‘parity’ requires attention to the details of how IBE functions in 
arguments used by Scientific Realists, in order to identify the inferences that are being made 
and to see whether those same inferential strategies can also (with no additional inferential 
resources) be used to deliver mathematical realism. So an overarching question that guides 
our investigation here is: do proponents of EIA (‘explanationists’) make an appropriate use 
of IBE in order for them to argue for realism about mathematics? This question concerns 
whether the kind of parity of reasoning between Scientific Realism and Mathematical Real-
ism is really present: do Mathematical Realists employ IBE in the same way as Scientific Re-
alists do with respect to establishing existence claims, or do they use IBE differently in argu-
ing for the existence of abstracta? We will argue that IBE is not used in arguments for Scien-
tific Realism in the same way that it is used by mathematical explanationists, because Scien-
tific Realists invoke a causal model of explanation when arguing for the existence of entities. 
Since abstracta are causally inefficacious, ‘parity’ with the inferential resources used by Scien-
tific Realists will not deliver platonism. The subsequent question, for section 4, is whether 
Scientific realists should change the way that they employ IBE, and permit a non-causal 
model of explanation when making inference about the existence of entities. 
§2 Inference to the Best Explanation in Scientific Realism 
Mark Colyvan builds his (2006) case for Mathematical Realism on the basis that Scientific 
Realists use IBE when arguing from observations to the existence of unobservables. This is 
correct: IBE in one form or another is widely accepted amongst Scientific Realists. The gen-
eral form of an Indispensability Argument for Mathematical Realism that he discusses coun-
sels us to accept the existence of any entity which plays an indispensable role in science. He 
agrees with Hartry Field that “one way that an entity might play an indispensable role in a 
scientific theory is in virtue of it being indispensable for explanation”, and also with Field’s 
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claim that “inference to the best explanation is a special case of the indispensability argu-
ment” (Colyvan 2006: 227, Field 1989: 14-20).  
However, it is important to be clear about what kind of IBE features in Scientific Realist ar-
guments, and how it works. For one thing, it is crucial what kind of explanations feature in 
Scientific Realism. Colyvan is well aware that a number of Scientific Realists are happy to 
employ a particularly limited variety of IBE, inference to the most likely cause, and that 
those who do are not inclined to accepting abductive inferences that take them beyond infer-
ences about causally operative entities. Baker’s response to this kind of challenge is to sug-
gest that to insist on causal explanations in science is to be question-begging against mathe-
matical platonism (2005: 234), since abstracta are causally inefficacious. We note that such a 
complaint should not unduly worry Scientific Realists who insist upon causal explanation 
for what they perceive to be independent philosophically respectable grounds, such as not to 
risk making inferences that are unduly epistemically risky. Given the way that we have set up 
the EIA, and its explicit appeal to ‘parity’, that the platonist cannot convince the Scientific 
Realist using the Scientific Realist’s own tools is primarily a problem for the platonist. 
Colyvan, in contrast, has exploited this observation to design a dilemma for any kind of sci-
entific realist intent on arguing for scientific realism by means of IBE (Colyvan 2001). The 
dilemma is as follows. On the one hand, Scientific Realists may choose to use only versions 
of IBE that are limited to causal explanations (IBCE). A number of Scientific Realists moti-
vate their realist conclusions precisely on that basis, notably Cartwright (1983), Hacking 
(1983) and Cheyne (1998). However, Colyvan (2001) suggests that limiting the scope of Sci-
entific Realism to those kinds of entities that one may causally interact with necessarily con-
flicts with the fact that there are plenty of entities about which, intuitively, one ought to be a 
realist. As examples of such putatively real yet causally-inaccessible objects, Colyvan men-
tions entities outside the lightcone, like planets and black holes, and offers the case of 
Mendeleev who, prior to the experimentally confirmed discovery of germanium (prior to 
1878), was seemingly justified in believing that germanium exists, in virtue of having inferred 
to its existence by ampliative reasoning. One cannot be a realist in these cases while insisting 
upon a version of IBCE. 
On the other hand, Colyvan argues that Scientific Realists can accept that inferring to the 
best explanation is guided by recognizing a whole range of variables can be ‘better making’ 
properties (or virtues) of explanations, and that identifying causes is only one virtue amongst 
many, and is not a necessary condition. Once Scientific Realists endorse this more general 
(because less restrictive) picture of IBE, they are in a position to account for knowledge of 
these kinds of objects that one might intuitively like to be a realist about. However, since ac-
cepting this general version of IBE effectively lifts any restriction on inferring to the existence 
of causally-inefficacious entities, it follows that there is nothing inherent in the Scientific Re-
alists’ exercise of IBE which prevents its being recruited to the Mathematical Realist’s goal of 
inferring to the existence of abstract entities.  
Colyvan’s dilemma for Scientific Realists is between accepting IBCE and being realist about 
too little, or accepting a more general IBE and being realist about not only entities outside of 
the lightcone, but also about mathematical entities (and thus from the point of view of cer-
tain Scientific Realists, e.g. Musgrave (1986), altogether too much realism). Colyvan thinks 
they should accept the general (non-causal) version of IBE and the platonism that accompa-
nies it. In this sense, Colyvan thinks EIA maintains parity with what Scientific Realists 
should say. In the next section we argue that Colyvan is right: that when it comes to arguing 
for the existence of entities, Scientific Realists restrict themselves to causal models of expla-
nation. In section 4, we argue that Scientific Realists can respond to Colyvan’s dilemma 
without having to endorse a version of IBE for which considerations of ‘parity’ might entail 
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that they should be Mathematical Realists. We note, for the time being, that it does not fol-
low from that fact that Colyvan gives this advice or prescription that any Scientific Realists 
actually take it. That he thinks a general (non-causal) version of IBE is what Scientific Real-
ists should endorse does not entail that any of them do endorse it; ‘parity’ requires that they 
do.  7
§3 Different inferences at work in Scientific Realism 
Colyvan’s recommendation for scientific realists was to accept a variety of IBE that works on 
a general criterion of goodness of explanation, severed from considerations about causes. It 
is certainly true that Scientific Realists do not always need to insist on a causal account of 
explanation, and superficially this looks like Colyvan is in line with how scientific realists 
have proceeded in the past. But there are several things to note about this point. The first is 
that there is an abundance of different varieties of ampliative reasoning. Schurz (2008) lists a 
catalogue of abductive inferences, all of which are identified as inferences that are used for 
the purpose of scientific discovery. That is, there is more than one way that actual scientists 
actually reason, abductively. Not only are there a range of different varieties of ‘vertical’ in-
ductive inferences (rather than the straightforward ‘horizontal’ inferences that result from 
enumerative inductions ), but there are at least as many different varieties of IBE as there are 8
criteria for selecting between theories. All of them are employed to make inferences which go 
beyond our immediately available observable evidence, and many of them are prima facie 
sufficient to make inferences which go beyond identifying causes. 
The second thing to notice is that different types of ampliative reasoning serve different roles 
and purposes, not only in science but also in the kinds of debates in which Scientific Realists 
engage. For example, IBE is sometimes appealed to in answer to how we might select be-
tween competing empirically adequate theories. In other instances, other varieties of IBE 
might be used, such as when Scientific Realists argue that we have a reason to believe that a 
particular kind of entity exists. And the fact that a Scientific Realist might be willing to use 
one form of inference in one type of case does not entail that they are thereby committed to 
sanctioning its application in all or any other cases.  An inference to the best explanation 9
deployed to counter underdetermination problems is different to such an inference being 
employed for the purpose of accounting for the discovery of some phenomenon. The role of 
IBE in the ‘No Miracles’ argument is different once again; the inferences involved in defend-
ing a realist position from a skeptical challenge such as the Pessimistic Meta-Induction is not 
the same as the inference involved in concluding that without realism, much of science’s abil-
ity to predict and explain would be ‘miraculous’.  10
 Colyvan relies upon the idea that this is a genuine dilemma for Scientific Realists in order to set up a subsequent chal7 -
lenge for prospective nominalists. The subsequent challenge is that nominalists must either take an ‘easy road’ to nomi-
nalism, and deny that there are GMEs, or else take a ‘hard road’ and successfully carry out an ambitious nominalisation 
project (similar to Field’s 1980 proposal), and he believes that there is no ‘easy road’ (Colyvan 2010, 2012). We argue 
below that Scientific Realists can avoid the initial dilemma, and so it follows that the ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ roads do not ex-
haust their options for being nominalists about mathematical entities.
 The horizontal/vertical inference distinction is discussed by Peter Lipton (Lipton 2000: 185-6).8
 John Norton’s ‘material theory’ of induction makes a case for this claim quite neatly – whether a particular ampliative 9
inference is rationally defensible depends upon a ‘material postulate’ which is local to the domain within which the in-
ference is being made. See Norton 2003.
 See Busch (2011) for a comparison between the role of IBE in defending Scientific Realism and its role in arguing 10
for Scientific Realism.
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As such, we should be very careful not to equivocate between different modes of ampliative 
reasoning, and we should be careful not to generalize too hastily from some particular appli-
cations of IBE in some particular instances to the conclusion that Scientific Realists are 
committed to the general form of inference on offer.  In order to show that Scientific realists 11
are committed to Mathematical Realism in virtue of their reliance on IBE, it has to be estab-
lished that the kind of IBE employed by Scientific Realists when arguing for the existence of 
entities is the same kind of IBE required for the EIA to work. That is: ‘parity’ must be ob-
served to hold between EIA and the inferences that Scientific Realists rely on when working 
out whether some entity or other exists.  
While Scientific Realists might in principle attempt to make use of more general (non-causal) 
versions of IBE in specific cases, when the existence of unobservable entities is concerned we 
see them using narrower (causal) versions of IBE. In fact, causes show up not only in argu-
ments for the existence of entities, but also for other realist ontologies in the philosophy of 
science. Causally-grounded inferences are central in the work of Nancy Cartwright (1983, 
essay 5), Ian Hacking (1983) and Ronald Giere (1988) in arguing for ‘entity’ realism. Causes 
are are similarly significant features of inferences for ‘structural’ realist positions.  Wesley 12
Salmon appeals to the unifying properties of theories that invoke unobservable objects to 
explain particular phenomena, but even this is a causal account at heart (Salmon 1984: 213-
227).  Stathis Psillos expresses the core of Realism thus: 13
“When scientists talk about the nature of an entity, what they normally do – apart 
from positing a causal agent – is to ascribe to this entity a grouping of basic prop-
erties and relations. They then describe its law-like behaviour by means of a set of 
equations. In other words, they endow this causal agent with a certain causal 
structure, and they talk about the way in which this entity is structured.” (1999: 
155) 
Furthermore, it is clear that arguing for Scientific Realism is a piecemeal exercise (Achinstein 
2002; Psillos 2009, 2011a, 2011b). Scientific Realism about a theory, or about a particular 
domain, is argued for by very specific arguments for each particular unobservable entity in 
that theory.  
In one sense, the point raised here might seem moot: if most Scientific Realists only reason 
on the basis of causes, it is perhaps because they precisely wish to avoid risky commitments, 
and that may include the risk of commitments to abstract objects. This is the concern raised 
by Baker; that limiting Scientific Realism to inferences involving causes is to beg the question 
against platonism (see section 1 above). But as we have seen, the platonist’s central argument 
turns on whether Scientific Realists’ own resources can be exploited to entail (by way of 
GME and EIA) mathematical platonism. If the resources of Scientific Realists do not include 
 For discussion of a related point, see Saatsi 2009.11
  Grover Maxwell (1970: 17) “Causal connection must be counted among these structural properties, for it is by virtue 12
of them that the unobservables interact with one another and with observables and, thus, that Ramsey sentences have 
observable consequences.” For discussion of this issue, and the general claim that the ontology of Scientific Realism is 
wedded to causal features, see Chakravartty (2007, esp. 27-45).
  Unification is often championed as one of the virtues that mathematics contributes to the bestness of an explanation 13
or a theory (see Friedman 1974, Kitcher 1981). Note that Salmon's treatment of these cases does not explicitly appeal to 
IBE, but to the Common Cause principle.
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non-causal inferential strategies when it comes to determining what exists, then these re-
sources cannot be used to reason for mathematical platonism.  14
If this is correct, and the ampliative inferences that realists standardly use to argue for the 
existence of theoretical (unobservable) entities are causal inferences, it seems that Scientific 
Realists may face the first horn of Colyvan’s dilemma; that they might end up being realists 
about too few things.  He maintains that Scientific Realists should be Mathematical Realists 
on the basis that Scientific Realists should endorse a more liberal notion of Inference to the 
Best Explanation than they do. We address this issue next. 
§4 The first horn of Colyvna’s dilemma and Selective Realisms 
There are at least two strategies we wish to consider for addressing the concern that Scientif-
ic Realists who limit themselves to causal-based versions of IBE (which we label IBCE, ‘infer-
ence to the best causal explanation’) are in danger of being realist about too few entities. The 
first is to respond to each of Colyvan’s examples (black holes, germanium) on a case-by-case 
basis. This strategy has the pleasing particularity that is associated with Scientific Realists’ 
piecemeal approach. The second strategy is to try to make a more generic reply. We will at-
tempt each in turn. 
The first strategy is to deal with the examples in Colyvan’s dilemma on a case-by-case basis, 
and we will divide it into two distinct types of reply accordingly. The first horn of Colyvan’s 
dilemma is to say that there are entities which prima facie it looks like Scientific Realists 
should want to be able to be realists about. Examples that he mentions are planets and black 
holes outside our lightcone, and that scientific realists should be able to account for how 
Mendeleev had reason to believe that germanium existed prior to its (experimental) discov-
ery. However, if Scientific Realists insist on restricting their inferential resources to IBCE, 
then since these cases involve entities which go beyond the causally-constrained limits of sci-
entists’ epistemic and inferential abilities, the Scientific Realist will instead be limited to re-
maining agnostic about these entities. The loss, for the Realist, is that of not being able to 
respect the prima facie intuitive appeal of the claim that we do have good reason to believe 
that these entities exist.  
There are a couple of things that the Scientific Realist can say here, and there is no particular 
reason to think that one or other kind of reply should generalise for both cases (or all possi-
ble cases). The first option for replying is for the Scientific Realist to give an account of the 
kinds of abductive inferences which would be sufficient for being realist about the existence 
of the entities in these cases, but which might nevertheless be inferential resources that are 
insufficient for EIA, in which case ‘parity’ would not be achieved. If correct, this reply would 
show that Colyvan’s dilemma is a false dilemma: Scientific Realists can respect the intuition 
of realism about one or other of the cases while still not employing a version of IBE which 
permits realism about mathematical objects. We will suggest that this reply can be used in 
the case of knowledge about black holes and other entities outside the cone. 
  Part of the debate here might turn on determining what is a permissible or acceptable set of operative norms for Sci14 -
entific Realism: can there be a blanket ban on the involvement of any abstract objects? Bangu (2013: 257) makes this 
point: if our starting point is some form of philosophical naturalism that eschews any sort of involvement with abstracta 
then it is clear that the Indispensability Argument will not work. But both he and Baker seem to be at home with another 
version of naturalism, one that takes actual scientific practices seriously. They think that since practising scientists seem 
to be at home with invoking abstracta in their explanations of physical phenomena – not just mathematical objects, but 
such abstract objects as ‘species’ – then our Scientific Realist should have no a priori restriction against the involvement 
of abstracta. The methodology of the philosophy of science is not something we will explore further here.
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The second option for replying is to respond directly to the idea that Colyvan has identified 
a case in which we have a prima facie intuition of realism about kinds of entities like germa-
nium. There is certainly something strange about the idea that Scientific Realists should en-
dorse wide-ranging and perhaps overly-liberal inferential resources in order to account for 
an intuition of realism. In general (and it is hard to generalise), Scientific Realists attempt to 
amass a lot of detailed evidential reasons for inferring that an entity is real or known about, 
rather than relying on a prima facie intuition concerning the case history. What look like 
good reasons for belief might, upon closer inspection or hindsight, no longer seem worth 
pursuing; once the details of the situation are uncovered, the intuition that something is real 
or known about can disappear. 
How can Scientific Realists be realist about objects outside the cone without endorsing a ver-
sion of IBE sufficient for EIA to work? We sketch an argument to show that knowledge of 
entities beyond our causal reach (e.g. entities beyond our light cone) can be inferred on the 
basis of an enumerative induction. Achinstein argues that one can vary conditions on the 
properties in virtue of which something is observable (or unobservable) in virtue of their 
size, their distance from us in space and time, their duration, their interaction (or lack there-
of) with other items, and so on. We can vary many of the conditions in virtue of which bod-
ies are observable and throughout find no difference in whether those bodies have mass. On 
this basis, and if we have no contrary information, we have an empirical argument to sup-
port the claim that the fact that all observed bodies are observable does not bias the ob-
served sample with regards to the property of having mass (Achinstein 2002, pp 484 – 485). 
For the Scientific Realist, (un)observability is irrelevant to objects having the kind of proper-
ties that we ordinarily attribute to them (spatio-temporal properties), while an antirealist 
takes 'observability/unobservability' to be a really important distinction. As our ability to 
extend our ‘epistemic reach’ has developed within the cone, we have experienced the exis-
tence of at least the same kinds of entities as we have encountered before. By enumerative 
induction we should expect the trend to continue, such that we should expect (inductively 
infer) that there are objects outside the cone which will also have mass. But this kind of in-
ference cannot be exploited (by ‘parity’) in an EIA to establish the existence of numbers since 
they have no spatio-temporal properties. In this case, Colyvan’s first horn is the first horn of 
a false dilemma. 
In the second case that Colvan proposes, that Mendeleev’s knowledge of the existence of 
germanium, a version of our reply to the point above could be employed here as well. In 
Scerri’s (2007) detailed study of how Mendeleev came to construct his periodic table it is 
made quite clear that Mendeleev based his construction of the periodic table on the underly-
ing premise that there exists a ‘periodic law’ that governed the distribution of chemical prop-
erties of elements, corresponding to their weight. Thus, the inference that Mendeleev made in 
order to conclude that there was good reason to believe that germanium exists can, in one 
sense, be reconstructed as an inference from a generalization.  In fact, Mendeleev wrote that 15
what he took to be the deciding difference between himself and contemporaries like Meyer 
was his own firm belief in ‘the periodic law’. On the methodological level, Mendeleev’s 
method for calculating the weight of germanium involved dividing the combined weights of 
the four elements flanking germanium by four. If there is a kind of distinctively abductive in-
ference involved, it perhaps best resembles an argument by analogy, in which Mendeleev rea-
soned that the properties of germanium could be derived using the same methods as he had 
used for calculating the properties of other elements (his reasoning being based on the as-
  Medeleev’s inference to the existence of germanium was certainly more complicated than this, since it included at15 -
tending to the gappiness of his table. But its gaps could only be identified as being gaps in virtue of the assumption of a 
periodic law.
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sumption of the underlying periodic law), where in some cases those properties were known 
and could be used to test for the reliability of the procedure.  
So in Colyvan’s examples of how Scientific Realists seem to be committed to using amplia-
tive modes of inference that extend beyond causally constrained varieties of IBE, we do see 
the need for a variety of a mode of inference that extends beyond causal inference. But the 
mere fact that scientific realists use ampliative modes of inference is not quite an argument in 
favour of them being committed to a variety of ampliative inference of the kind that Colyvan 
requires (that is: one sufficient for the EIA). Rather, in the case at hand, it is not at all clear 
how similar kinds of ampliative inferences might be employed in arguing for the existence of 
mathematical entities –  ‘parity’ with these of Mendeleev’s methods does not seem like a 
promising strategy for Mathematical Realists for showing that scientific realists are commit-
ted to mathematical entities in virtue of their reliance of ampliative modes of inference. For 
that argument to work, Colyvan needs to find examples of scientific realists actually employ-
ing ampliative modes of inference similar to the variety that he believes will advance mathe-
matical realism and in a way that actually suggests that they take such inferences to be onto-
logically committing.  
So much for the case-by-case strategy. The second strategy is to make a more generic reply to 
the kind of dilemma that Colyvan proposes. Suppose, counterfactually, that the Scientific 
Realist wants a halfway house: they acknowledge Colyvan’s intution of realism in cases like 
black holes, agree that inferring to the existence of black holes necessarily goes beyond our 
causal connection to entities (in ways that inferring to the existence of future states of affairs 
seemingly does not?), and are willing to endorse inferential methods which are broader than 
IBCE, which permit them to make inferences without requiring causal explanations or causal 
features. We think that this does not mean that Scientific Realists need to endorse a version 
of IBE which has no further restrictions in place, and thus one which will also permit EIA to 
work. They can still insist on other restrictions on acceptable inferences, which, while not 
insisting on causal contributions, will make ‘parity’ slightly harder to achieve for proponents 
of EIA. And their insistence on these restrictions need not be motivated (question-beggingly) 
simply by a preference for avoiding ontological commitments to abstracta.  
In fact, many Scientific Realists already do something like this. That is: they demand certain 
evidential standards of their inferential principles which make ‘parity’ slightly harder to 
achieve. Many Scientific Realists want to be Selective Realists. That is: they want to be realist 
about electrons and germanium while not being realist about frictionless planes and other 
‘scientific idealisations’. They want to be able to be realists about some-but-not-all of their 
theories, and, in addition, some-but-not-all of the properties of the things in their theories. 
Their selectivity comes precisely from requiring that they can identify, of the purported entity 
or property, what contribution it is making ‘in its own right’, to borrow Baker’s idiom (see 
section 1). Different Scientific Realist accounts attempt to achieve this differently, but they do 
attempt to achieve it.  The fact that the Scientific Realist actively takes up the burden here 16
suggests that to maintain ‘parity’, the explanationist platonist must also specify how and in 
what way the mathematical explanans is ‘explanatory in its own right’. That is: if mathemat-
ical explanationists wish to preserve ‘parity’ with Scientific Realists, they must ensure that 
 An anonymous referee suggested that we need to give some sort of justification as to why scientific realists are al16 -
lowed to be selective, otherwise they may appear to be unprincipled or engaging in some sort of ad hoc practice. We 
shall attempt no defence here (although we note that the selectiveness is not motivated by or embarked upon in an at-
tempt to avoid being committed to abstracta), the interested reader can consult Chakravartty (1998, 2007: 48-51) and 
Juha Saatsi (2005) for examples of how to be selective. Rather, our point is a broader one: that the Mathematical Realist 
should not assume that the Scientific Realist has a general purpose strategy for inferring the existence of entities that 
can also be exploited to generate Platonism. 
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their candidate explanantia are able to reach to the same explanatory standards as are re-
quired by Scientific Realists for their explanantia. In particular, it is insufficient for mathe-
matical platonists to cite Genuine Mathematical Explanations in which they cannot specify 
how and in what way the mathematical entities involved directly contribute, in and of them-
selves, to the explanatoriness of the explanans that they put forward. In this way, concentra-
tion on the details of what it takes achieve ‘parity’ with Scientific Realism suggests that, pace 
Baker (2009), there is a burden of proof on platonists to say more about the way that math-
ematical entities can be explanatorily effective.   17
§5 Conclusion 
Our central question concerns the argumentative (and inferential) strategy of the Enhanced 
Indispensability Argument: do people who defend the EIA make an appropriate use of the 
resources of Scientific Realism to be able to achieve platonism? In this paper we have argued 
that just because some non-causal versions of IBE have been used in some arguments for Sci-
entific Realism does not mean that it is these versions of IBE alone which deliver the (onto-
logical) conclusions about which things we should be Scientific Realists about. We have sug-
gested that explanationists should give some details about how and in what way mathemati-
cal entities are explanatory ‘in their own right’, since it is problematic if those mathematical 
entities do not directly contribute to Genuine Mathematical Explanations, since Scientific 
Realists already insist on this in their explanatory arguments for the existence of entities, and 
since it is in the strategic interests of mathematical explanationists that this kind of inferen-
tial parity with Scientific Realism should be maintained. 
The discussions about the various Indispensability Arguments have moved on from trying to 
debate whether all Naturalists must be platonists (see Resnik (1997), Maddy (1997), Sober 
(1993)), in part because Naturalism’s purported commitments to holism and an unreflective 
endorsement of anything that features anywhere in science made them seem like easy targets; 
coupled with the Naturalist’s disdain for ontology in the first place, the debates quickly stag-
nated. In contrast, trying to show that all Scientific Realists should be platonists seems to be 
a richer, more fertile ground for discussion, since Scientific Realists certainly take ontology 
seriously (cf. Morrison, 2013). While parts of the debate take it for granted that Scientific 
Realists are simply Naturalists, it seems clear that Scientific Realists take on a heavier argu-
mentative burden. What we have tried to show is that Scientific Realists take the existence of 
entities sufficiently seriously that there is no easy path to replicating their detailed, nuanced 
ontological conclusions in completely distinct contexts simply by wielding a generalised ver-
sion of one of their inferential tools (IBE). We think it likely that only Scientific Realists who 
 We note that Baker (2012) is a recent attempt to pin down the nature of mathematical explanation in science, and in 17
this sense, Baker may be coming round to accepting a burden of proof that he has previously repudiated. In that paper, 
Baker suggests that, given the existence of GMEs, the nature of mathematical explanation in science poses a significant 
challenge to general accounts of scientific explanation. The point of our argument here is show that GMEs can only be 
used in EIA if parity with Scientific Realists accounts of explanation is maintained. Baker is right to try to pin down the 
nature of how mathematical entities can contribute to scientific explanations; our argument here is that, independent of 
anything else he might reveal about mathematical explanation in science, unless explanation functions in way which 
maintains parity, Scientific Realists have no reason to accept EIA. Thanks to Josh Hunt for encouraging this point.
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are unaware of the kinds of tools they actually use should endorse mathematical platonism 
on the basis of EIA.  18
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